This paper studies the relationship between union membership and electoral representation of workers. I show that a reduction in political representation of working-class voters led to a decline in electoral turnout and a rise in union membership. These results are based on a historical episode in 19th-century Germany, where near-universal manhood suffrage for Saxon state elections was replaced by a restrictive, class-based scheme that allocated voting power based on tax payments while leaving the electoral system for national elections unchanged. In a difference-in-differences framework, I compare the behavior of voters in the same jurisdictions in national vs. state elections within the Kingdom of Saxony. I document that voter turnout falls by 9.54 percentage points (19%) in the treated state-level elections relative to national elections, and this decrease is driven by lower-income workers abstaining from the state vote. Next, I show how the reform affected the composition of the state parliament by drawing on a novel biographical dataset capturing the socioeconomic background of all members of parliament (MPs) between 1869 and 1918. Beyond decreasing the number of seats held by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) to zero, the antidemocratic suffrage reform yielded a sharp increase in the number of newly elected MPs that can be classified as "industrialists," e.g., because they own a factory or have otherwise strong ties to industry. I then study whether this negative shock to workers' electoral representation led to a change in union membership – an alternative channel through which workers could collectively express their demands. To that end, I draw on newly digitized panel data on union membership in the German Empire at the county-industry level matched with employment information from the 1895 census. Using a difference-in-differences design across states, I show that the decrease in electoral representation among lower-income workers in Saxony led to a 4 percentage point increase in union membership, suggesting that union power and electoral voice are substitutes. Finally, I study whether MPs who were personally exposed to the threat of union organizing, through their ownership of factories, voted to return to universal, equally weighted suffrage in 1909. This provides evidence of the importance of personal financial interests for legislative behavior and evidence that elites believe extending the franchise placates working-class voters and reduces labor strife.